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Book Reviews
Playing God? Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of
Public Bioethical Debate. By John H. Evans. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. viii304. $54.00 (cloth); $20.00 (paper).
Paul Root Wolpe
University of Pennsylvania
Bioethics, once an obscure field, is in the process of professionalization.
Today, virtually every major university has a bioethics program, and
bioethicists testify in front of Congress and are ubiquitous in the media.
In perhaps the final confirmation of bioethics’ coming of age, recent books
have attacked bioethics as being too liberal, too powerful, or, in the case
of John Evans’s excellent if imperfect new book, too shallow.
Playing God? is a sophisticated examination of the history of American
debate over human genetic engineering (HGE). Evans analyzes patterns
of citations in the literature on HGE from 1959 to 1974, elucidating the
alliances and claims making of the scientists and theologians who were
involved in the debate. Evans’s goal is to explain why, in his view, the
early debates over ultimate values have devolved into the “eviscerated”
debates of our own time.
Evans employs the Weberian distinction between arguments of sub-
stantive rationality (pursuit of ultimate ends) and formal rationality (pur-
suing proximate ends), and Habermas’s claim that the “life world” has
been subsumed by the latter. Evans, however, rejects the “deep assump-
tions” of Western intellectual thought that formal rationality will inexo-
rably replace substantive rationality, and he argues instead that formal
rationality is not a historical inevitability but a culturally constructed
product of particular actors pursuing particular interests.
Early HGE debates involved competition between genetic scientists
and theologians for rhetorical primacy. Scientists, whose rhetoric encom-
passed not just a technology for improving human beings, but a set of
claims as to what were the desired ends of that improvement, ran smack
into the jurisdiction of theologians. The theologians, on the other hand,
were whipping up public concern over HGE, which threatened the sci-
entists’ jurisdiction as legislators considered laws limiting some types of
genetic research.
Scientists responded by “thinning out” their claims, suggesting that their
only goal was therapy—the relief of human suffering—rather than a vision
of overall human improvement. They strongly lobbied against govern-
mental regulation, which might bind them in ways that they feared would
erode both their scientific pursuits and their authority, and they managed
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to channel debate into a series of governmental advisory commissions,
which, by their nature, tend both to have limited power and to frame
debates in formally rational terms. There were two consequences of this
jurisdictional dispute, argues Evans. First, the power of bioethicists began
to rise as they populated the advisory commissions and, in Evans’s view,
became handmaidens to the goals of the scientists. Second, “thick” debate
over the desirability of HGE disappeared from public discourse.
As well-argued and powerful as Evans’s presentation is, he falters when
he traces the rise of bioethics and formal rationality to the creation of
advisory commissions. He argues, for example, that “through the influence
of the first government advisory commission, [bioethics’] form of argu-
mentation [formal rationality] was written into public law as the proper
method of making ethical decisions about research involving human sub-
jects” (p. 73). Perhaps Evans is correct, but the advisory commissions’
language seems little different from that of the Nuremberg Code or the
Declaration of Helsinki. In addition, almost all these documents (including
the commissions’) take great pains to express substantively rational points
about the goal of protecting humans and human dignity, the ends of
science as a human pursuit, and so on.
In order to portray bioethicists as sharing a rhetorical strategy, Evans
engages in a rhetorical flourish of his own. In his parsing of authors into
categories (scientists, theologians, bioethicists, etc.) Evans defines anyone
who does not argue formal rationality as not a bioethicist. This strategy
surely would appear strange to bioethicists themselves. Are Paul Ramsey
and Joseph Fletcher not bioethicists? Almost all bioethicists regard them
as founders of the field. Leon Kass is not a bioethicist? President Bush
might be surprised, as he named Kass the chair of his Bioethics Advisory
Commission. George Annas is not a bioethicist? Boston University might
be surprised, as they named him the Edward R. Utley Professor of Health
Law, Bioethics, and Human Rights.
In addition, the bioethics community, in a host of journal articles, books,
and conferences, argues issues of substantive rationality virtually end-
lessly. In public talks, on radio and television, and in op-ed pieces, bio-
ethicists publicly discuss the most fundamental issues of human strivings
and ultimate goals. So why does it seem that the debate is so shallow in
the public forum?
The reason may not be the one that Evans suggests, that it is a strategy
to gain power and to ally bioethicists with scientists. It may be that, in
fact, it is not the place of public commissions in a liberal, democratic
society to argue substantive rationality. Our society is designed to have
its discussion of ultimate ends as part of civil society—in its newspapers,
from its pulpits, and around watercoolers. Presidential commissions and
the resulting legislative recommendations such commissions make are
probably better off staying away from discussions of ultimate ends.
Of course, these objections are not intended to detract from this well-
written, well-researched, and valuable book. Evans’s book is, in fact, a
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model of sociological analysis of bioethics’ emergence as a professional
pursuit. As the power of biotechnology increasingly promises to change
our lives and challenges us to define our values, sociological examination
of the process of bioethical decision making in the United States will only
become more important. Evans’s book stands as a signal effort in that
endeavor.
The Social Construction of the Ocean. By Philip E. Steinberg. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. 270. $60.00 (cloth); $22.00 (paper).
Michael M. Bell
University of Wisconsin, Madison
The hottest debate in the environmental social sciences continues to be
between the “realists” and the “constructionists.” The realists argue that
the material and social organizational constraints of the environment have
long been ignored by society and by the social sciences, and the construc-
tionists argue that what needs to be studied is the social origin of the very
ideas of environmentalism and antienvironmentalism. As the noted Marx-
ist (and realist) environmental sociologist Peter Dickens (Reconstructing
Nature [Routledge, 1996]) observed a few years ago, “insofar as academia
is capable of having a stand-up row, it is over this issue” (p. 72). At heart,
this is a political debate. Realists worry that constructionists are under-
mining the environmental movement by relativizing its ideas, and con-
structionists worry that realists are uncritically embracing a popular ide-
ology and abdicating their academic responsibility. This little bit of
academic global warming continues apace, with many articles devoted to
the topic in professional journals in the last few years.
Thus, I must confess that it was with some weariness and wariness
that I picked up Philip Steinberg’s book, The Social Construction of the
Ocean. Many in environmental sociology, including me, have been trying
to move the field beyond this unnecessarily dichotomous and polarizing
debate. And here was a title that appeared to purport to being another
one-sided take, in this instance from the side of constructionism. We al-
ready have enough books whose titles start with the words “the social
construction of. . .” (My library lists 45 such books, including several on
explicitly environmental themes). It all seemed so very “nineties.”
But I was pleasantly surprised by what I found in the pages of this
“the social construction of. . .” title. While Steinberg, a geographer, does
not directly position his book within the mainly sociological realist-
constructionist debate, it is clear that one of his principal goals is to
transcend the materialist-idealist dichotomy at work in this “row,” offering
a political economy perspective on what he terms “ocean-space.” Steinberg
bases his political economy on three main foundations: world-systems
theory, articulation theory, and Castells’s spatial dialectics, but with his
